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HOW THE CAPITAL
ESCAPED A SEVERE
RECESSION
The UK economy has been through the
worst recession since the 1930s and after
four quarters of recovery, it seems to
have contracted once again in the last
three months of 2010. More pain is
likely as the government’s programme
of ‘fiscal consolidation’ starts to bite. In
these gloomy circumstances, it is
perhaps not surprising that the focus of
economic policy debate is turning to the
potential sources of future growth and
what measures might support them
most effectively.
Innovation is one key driver of
growth – and it has been the focus of a
substantial body of research at the
Centre for Economic Performance (CEP).
One article in this CentrePiece reveals
the importance of the geographical
location of corporate research labs for
local productivity growth. This is
particularly topical with Pfizer’s
announcement that it will be closing its
main UK research lab – where Viagra
was created.  In a recent LSE lecture,
CEP’s director John Van Reenen
suggested that the Chancellor needs the
economic equivalent of Pfizer’s little blue
pill to boost the economy – a Plan V!
Another less discussed driver of
growth is high quality management –
and this too has been explored in depth
by the Centre. As our first article
explains, this research programme has
found strong evidence of the
importance of improving firms’
management practices for raising
productivity growth. Better managed
firms are not only more productive and
more profitable, but they are also more
pro-active in times of adversity. Better
management plays an equally important
role in national productivity growth,
where the UK is well behind the United
States, Germany, Japan and Sweden.
So what public policies can help reap
the growth benefits of improved
management? Among the
recommendations that emerge from
CEP’s work are increasing education and
skills (at both the high and low ends of
the skills distribution); promoting
competition, which can shrink the UK’s
‘long tail’ of badly managed firms; and
tax reform that gets rid of the
distortions that support inefficient
family-run firms. Many other CEP
findings relevant to the growth debate
are summarised in the Economic and
Social Research Council’s new report,
Recovery Britain: research evidence to
underpin a productive, fair and
sustainable return to growth.
In addition to the stories on UK
growth, this magazine describes
research on some big international
issues relevant to post-crisis recovery,
including European integration, the
trade collapse of 2008-09 and the
challenges of bank bailouts in a
globalised world. We also outline the
pathbreaking research on labour
markets by CEP’s Nobel laureate, Chris
Pissarides. And our cover story explores
London’s experience of recession and
recovery – and how the UK’s capital has
largely ‘got away with it’, at least so far.
Romesh Vaitilingam
Editor
romesh@vaitilingam.com
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I
n the wake of the global crisis,
governments are attempting to
rebalance their economies, enhance
competitiveness and position their
countries along sustainable growth paths.
Globally we are witnessing ever-
heightened attention to both the potential
sources of growth and what governments
can do to stimulate them.
While growth is often spoken of in
terms of GDP, from an economic
standpoint the main focus should be more
on productivity growth. It is productivity,
the measure of output per input, 
which drives the growth of real wages 
and consumption.
Productivity levels vary dramatically
across countries, with the UK falling
distinctly mid-table. Comparing GDP per
hour in 2009, the UK is 12% less
productive than the United States but 
also lags behind France and Germany.
These productivity gaps are persistent over
time, not only across countries but also
between firms even within narrowly
defined industries (see, for example, 
Foster et al, 2008).
What factors are driving these
differences? One possible explanation is
that the disparities are due to ‘hard’
technological innovations, such as research
and development, information technology
and patents. While these factors certainly
play a role, even when controlling for
them, productivity gaps still persist.
Another approach to explaining
productivity differences, long espoused by
business school academics and consultants
but less supported by economists, has
focused on the role of management
practices. Confirming this explanation is a
challenge, in part because of the difficulty
of measuring management.
Over the past decade, CEP has
undertaken a research programme to fill
this void by systematically measuring
management practices. Surveying almost
10,000 medium-sized manufacturing firms
across 20 countries (as well as
organisations in the retail, healthcare and
education sectors), we have shown that
better management practices are
associated with higher productivity and
other indicators of organisational
performance, such as profitability, return
on capital employed, sales growth and
firm survival rates (see, for example, 
Improving the quality of management in UK
firms could lead to significant gains in national
productivity. Rebecca Homkes outlines the
latest findings of CEP’s research programme on
the impact of management practices on 
the economic performance of firms and
countries – and their implications for policies 
to restore growth.
Enhancing 
management quality:
the potential for productivity
growth after the recession
Better management
practices are
associated with
higher productivity
and other indicators
of organisational
performance
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Bloom and Van Reenen, 2010). In fact, we
estimate that management practices 
can account for up to a third of the
differences in productivity between firms
and countries.
While the significance of management
practices seems clear given the strong
correlations between management and
performance, we cannot as yet say for sure
that the relationship is causal. One way to
overcome this is to run randomised trials,
where both improvements in management
and changes in performance can be
tracked over time. The next article in this
CentrePiece describes how we are
undertaking this in the context of large
manufacturing firms in India.
We have also recently expanded the
research programme to focus on the role
of innovations in managerial practice. In
2009, we re-surveyed approximately 
1,500 firms (including 256 UK firms) across
13 countries that we had interviewed in
2006, which has allowed us to build a
longitudinal panel. Given the challenges 
of the current climate, we also asked
managers a new set of questions – first,
about the constraints that they perceive
are impeding improvements in their
management practices; and second, how
their firms responded to the recession. 
Management across firms
and countries
Our work shows that significant differences
in management performance persist across
countries (see Figure 1). While the United
States outperforms all other countries,
developing countries such as China and
India lag behind. Noticeably mid-table, the
UK falls well below the United States and
Germany in terms of management
performance, though it scores similarly to
the rest of Northern Europe and Australia. 
Cross-country differences account 
for less than 10% of the diverging
management scores: the biggest
management differences occur across firms
within the same country. The distribution
of scores highlights the fact that much of
what drags certain countries down is a
persistent ‘tail’ of underperforming firms,
those that score less than a two on our five
point scale. While this tail is largely absent
in the United States, it is evident in the UK
and especially pronounced in developing
countries such as Brazil and India.
Changes in management
practices
A central finding of our research is that
management quality is fairly stable: firms
that were well managed in 2006 tend to
exhibit high quality management practices
in 2009. We also find that firms that 
were poorly managed in 2006 were more
likely to have closed, confirming that
management is significantly associated
with one key performance measure –
firms’ survival rates.
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Notes: Each bar represents the average management score (over 18 questions)
across all firms in each country. The results are based on 8,261 management
interviews between 2006 and 2010.
Figure 1:
UK management is mid-table by international standards
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Notes: Data from a total of 1,718 firms interviewed in 2006 and 2009/10 (263 US,
118 German, 253 UK, 157 French, 197 Chinese, 107 Indian firms).
Figure 2:
While relatively stable, across countries there is
improvement in management scores from 2006 to 2009
Better managed
firms are
significantly
more likely 
to engage in
cost-cutting
during a
recession
CentrePiece Winter 2010/11
4
On average firms have improved their
management scores over time, suggesting
that there is some learning behaviour and
diffusion of best practices across firms
(see Figure 2). A degree of cross-country
convergence in management over time is
also occurring with developing countries,
notably China, making the most
substantial gains. There have also been
notable improvements in the UK, allowing
it to catch up to some degree with the
top-performing United States.
The biggest changes have come in
operations management or the
implementation of lean technology and
practices. We also find that firms are
more likely to improve their management
scores when there is a new plant manager
on site, suggesting that managerial
turnover may be another potential driver
of management improvements.
Two other factors seem to matter in
determining management improvements:
increased product market competition
and skill levels. More competitive
environments are associated with better
management practices, and this positive
relationship holds up against other
measures, such as industry price-cost
margins or indicators of trade openness
(Bloom et al, 2007). Across countries,
another significant finding is that firms
that employ a greater number of
managers with university degrees are
much better managed than those with
less educated managers. 
Notes: Data from 265 UK, 266 US, 123 German, 211 Indian and 221 Chinese
companies interviewed in 2009/10.
Figure 3:
Constraints on improving management internationally
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Constraints on management
improvements
Across countries, an inadequate supply of
managerial human capital (‘hiring
managers with the right skills’) is the most
cited constraint on improving
management, while the second most cited
constraint is insufficient worker skills (see
Figure 3). UK managers face similar
constraints to their US, French and
German counterparts, which suggests that
while a scarcity of managerial talent may
be a major constraint, it is no more severe
than that facing their major competitors.
For developing countries this is much more
of an impediment, especially in India
where 56% of managers cite scarcity of
talent as a major constraint compared
with only 25% of US managers. 
Another major contrast between
developing and developed economies is in
the third most commonly cited constraint:
informational barriers or not knowing
what changes to make. Over 20% of
Indian firms and a quarter of Chinese
firms cite this as a major constraint
compared with around 10% in the UK
and the United States. Despite frequent
media attention, very few UK or US 
firms consider employment laws and
regulations to be a major obstacle, yet
they appear to be constraining 15% of
French firms and around a quarter of
German and Indian firms.
The impact of the recession
We asked managers the degree to which
various aspects of their operations – such
as costs, product mix and jobs – were
affected by the recent economic downturn
(see Figure 4). Overall, fewer changes
were seen in China and India than in the
developed countries, which is not
unexpected given the recession’s lesser
effect on growth in developing countries.
In the developed countries, investment
was the most severely affected variable,
but the UK actually made fewer cuts here
than the others.
In all countries, prices were relatively
unaffected by the recession – changes in
firms’ product mix were more common.
With employment, UK firms came second
only to the United States in terms of jobs
cuts: these fell less heavily in France and
Germany (which is consistent with the
known higher firing costs in continental
European countries). UK and French firms
were less aggressive in seeking to cut costs
than German and US firms (with the latter
being particularly severe).
A strong finding also emerges that
better managed firms were significantly
more likely to engage in cost-cutting
during the recession. This relationship
between management quality and active
changes also holds across other
dimensions of firms’ operations. This
suggests that better managed firms are
not only more productive and profitable,
but they may also be more pro-active
during times of adversity.
Implications for policy 
and practice
Our research shows that large and
persistent gaps in management quality
remain across countries, mainly driven by
the tail of underperforming firms. The UK
clearly has a deficit in management quality,
and this deficit is likely to be a key factor
explaining the persistent productivity gap
with other countries such as the United
States and Germany.
This lagging position would be
substantially improved by boosting the
management quality of the lower
performing tail of UK firms. As a large
proportion of these firms are family-
owned, attempts to spread key lessons to
these firms and encourage them to recruit
professional managers or expertise should
be examined. One policy response is to
remove the zero inheritance tax rating on
business assets passed within families.
Product market competition is one of
the most significant ways to boost
management quality. While the UK has
relatively strong competition policy, there
0 5% 10% 15% 20% 25%
Cut prices
Reduced 
investments
Reduced
employment
levels
Changed
product mix
Cost
cutting
Notes: Data from 265 companies interviewed in 2009/10. Each bar shows the
average percentage change across all firms.
Figure 4:
UK firms’ reactions to the credit crunch
The UK’s deficit in
management quality
helps to explain 
the persistent
productivity gap with
the United States,
France and Germany
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are a few areas to consider. Besides
continuing to ensure reduced regulatory
barriers to setting up and expanding
businesses, greater effort should be made
to advancing further trade liberalisation
and strengthening the European Union’s
services directive, which aims to boost
competition by making it easier for service
businesses to set up or sell their services
anywhere in Europe.
While the importance of skills
resonates throughout our research, this is
an area where the UK has a relatively poor
record: in the UK manufacturing firms we
surveyed, fewer managers had degrees
than in comparable countries. One way to
improve management is to increase the
supply of human capital, for example, by
allowing university expansion or by
increasing the availability of travel/work
visas for experienced managers.
Unfortunately, current education and
immigration policies seem to be moving in
the opposite direction.
Small firms seem to have particular
difficulties in gaining access to skills, which
highlights a role for management
education and other facilities to increase
the supply of capable managers. Smaller
firms also face the greatest constraints on
access to information. While propping up
firms on ‘artificial life support’ is not the
answer, this does imply that targeting
existing policies to smaller firms (for
example, business advice and skills
support) could generate substantial
benefits.
An overriding finding from managers’
responses to the recession is that it is
difficult to predict the actions firms will
take, which cautions against policy
responses targeted at particular firms or
industries. But better managed firms are
more pro-active, which suggests that
enhanced managerial capability also
produces more resilient firms, making them
more likely to survive periods of adversity.
Thus, better quality management could
decrease the output volatility of UK firms
over the business cycle.
Overall, our work suggests that
focusing on management quality is a key
way to enhance productivity, and we
highlight a few policies that could foster
these needed management improvements.
Given the still fragile nature of the current
business and economic climate – and
strained public coffers – there is an acute
need to get policy right.
Measuring management
To measure management practices, CEP
researchers interviewed plant managers in
medium-sized (approximately 250
employees) manufacturing firms. Plant
managers were selected because they are
senior enough to have a well-founded
perspective on what happens in a
company, but not so senior that they
might have lost touch with the shop floor.
We used an interview-based survey
evaluation tool that defines from worst
practice (‘1’) to best practice (‘5’) across
18 dimensions of management practices.
These practices fall into four broad areas:
operations, monitoring, targets and
people management. Each of these
dimensions is scored on a one to 
five basis, and the average of the 
18 separate scores made up the overall
management score.
To ensure accurate and unbiased
responses, we used a double-blind
technique: interviewed managers were
unaware of the scoring methodology and
interviewers have no information in
advance about the firm’s performance or
other differentiating characteristics.
Across countries, we obtained an
approximately 45% response rate. There
did not appear to be any bias in responses
received: responses were uncorrelated
with performance measures; and the non-
responder firms had roughly similar
management scores to the responder firms
in the original 2006 survey.
Rebecca Homkes is a CEP research officer
and project director of the Centre’s research
programme on management.
More details on the programme, including
past reports and full methodology, are
available here: http://cep.lse.ac.uk/_new/
research/productivity/management.asp
A free online tool, which firms and managers
can use to benchmark their own management
performance, is available here:
http://worldmanagementsurvey.org
Further reading
Nicholas Bloom, Stephen Dorgan, John
Dowdy, Christos Genakos, Raffaella Sadun
and John Van Reenen (2007) ‘Management
Practices and Productivity’, CEP/McKinsey 
& Company (http://cep.lse.ac.uk
/management/Management_Practice_and_
Productivity.pdf)
Nicholas Bloom and John Van Reenen (2010)
‘Why do Management Practices Differ across
Firms and Countries?’, Journal of Economic
Perspectives 24(1): 203-24
Lucia Foster, John Haltiwanger and Chad
Syverson (2008) ‘Reallocation, Firm Turnover,
and Efficiency: Selection on Productivity or
Profitability?’, American Economic Review,
98(1): 394-425
Product market
competition is
one of the most
significant ways
to boost
management
quality
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As the previous article describes, CEP research has found
systematic evidence of a strong relationship between
firms’ management practices and their performance. 
Our latest work has used field experiments to evaluate if
differences in management practices lead causally 
to differences in performance.
To do this, we improved the management of a 
randomly selected group of large Indian textile firms 
and compared the impact with a group of similar
‘control’ firms – a total of 20 firms, each with around
300 employees. All 20 firms were given an initial
management diagnostic and then the first group received
four months of free consulting from a major international
management consultancy.
To evaluate the productivity benefits of improved
management, we collected extremely detailed
performance metrics on output, inventory and quality at
the firms. The evidence suggests that Indian factories are
typically disorganised, with inventories and spare parts
chaotically organised, inadequate performance tracking
and extremely poor quality control.
The consultants addressed these problems by introducing
the types of basic operational practices that are standard
in European, Japanese and US factories. The practices
had massive effects on performance, cutting quality
defects by 50%, reducing inventories by 40% and
increasing overall productivity by 10%. They also
increased firms’ profits by about $200,000 and improved
owners’ ability to expand their firms.
So why have these practices not been adopted before?
Our evidence suggests that one key factor was 
informational constraints: the firms were not aware of the
importance of modern management practices. 
Why doesn’t product market competition drive the badly
managed firms out of business? One reason is that the
growth of well managed firms is constrained by the
number of adult males in the owning family who can fill
senior managerial positions. At the same time, entry by
new firms is limited by a lack of finance, and competition
from imports is restricted by heavy tariffs.
Finally, what are the policy lessons? First, competition and
foreign investment should be enhanced by removing the
legal, institutional and infrastructural barriers that limit
multinational expansion in India, which in turn limits
knowledge transfer about modern management practices.
Abolishing tariffs would also help, as Indian firms would
be driven to improve management practices to survive
against lower cost imports from countries like China.
Second, improving the legal environment would expand
the scope for well-managed firms to grow and drive out
badly managed firms. At present, the rule of law is weak
and fraud prosecutions are extremely hard, which makes
owners wary of letting outside managers have much
control over their firms.
Third, many of the shortcomings of Indian management
practices could be addressed through more widespread
training in basic operations management such as
inventory and quality control. Three-month courses
provided by a combination of industry, government and
universities could address the problem of firms not
implementing best practices on their own simply because
of a lack of information and knowledge. 
This article summarises ‘Does Management Matter? 
Evidence from India’ by Nicholas Bloom, Benn Eifert,
Aprajit Mahajan, David McKenzie and John Roberts, CEP
Discussion Paper No. 1042 http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/
dp1042.pdf).
Nicholas Bloom is a research associate in CEP’s productivity
and innovation programme. He, Aprajit Mahajan and John
Roberts are at Stanford University. Benn Eifert is at Overland
Advisors LLC. David McKenzie is at the World Bank.
Improving management in India
Firms in developing countries are typically managed badly. Research by
Nicholas Bloom and colleagues, looking at large Indian textile
manufacturers, finds that improving basic management practices has a
huge impact on corporate performance.
in brief...
A stock room in one of the Indian firms before intervention
8CEP researchers and colleagues at McKinsey & Company
have developed a tool for assessing management practices
in the private sector, which they are now using to look at
hospitals. As the article starting on page 2 of this
CentrePiece explains, the earlier research established a
clear relationship between management and other
indicators of firm performance, such as sales growth and
company survival rates. The question is whether there is a
similar relationship between hospital management and
hospital performance. 
To examine this question, the researchers have applied
their tool for measuring management to almost 1,200
hospitals in seven countries: the UK, the United States,
Canada, France, Germany, Italy and Sweden. The results
show that high quality management is just as vital in
public services and can even lead to reduced death rates
in NHS hospitals.
Measuring hospital management practices was done by
interviewing managers of cardiology or orthopaedics units
in hospitals that provide acute short-term medical and/or
surgical care. To obtain accurate and unbiased responses,
analysts conducted ‘double-blind’ interviews: hospital
managers were unaware of the criteria they were being
scored against while the interviewers were unaware of the
hospitals’ clinical and financial performance. 
The interviewers covered management practices in 
20 dimensions across operations management,
performance and target management, and people
management, with each dimension scored from one
(‘worst practice’) to five (‘best practice’). The overall
management score is an average across these 20 scores.
The study also linked the management survey with
hospital-level outcome statistics – from public data where
they are available (mostly in the UK and the United States)
or through the McKinsey Hospital Institute. These revealed
a strong relationship between hospital management
scores – specifically operations management and
implementing ‘lean practices’ (such as the efficiency of
patient flows through hospitals), performance
management and people management – and hospital
outcomes. 
Hospitals with higher management scores have better
clinical outcomes, such as lower mortality rates from
emergency heart attacks, as well as higher levels of
patient satisfaction and enhanced financial performance.
In the UK, a one point improvement in the management
score (on the one to five scale) is associated with a 6%
rate fall in deaths from heart attacks as well as a 20%
increase in the probability that the hospital scores above
average in terms of patient satisfaction.
Although the strong correlation between the
management scores and hospital performance does not
prove causality, it does suggest that management really
matters for patient wellbeing. 
Across countries, there is wide variation in management
scores, with the United States achieving the highest scores
and Italy and France the lowest. The UK delivers
particularly strong hospital management practices relative
to its health spending, outperforming the other countries.
The majority of differences in management quality 
Managers who 
combine clinical and
managerial skills 
are key to better
performance
Hospital performance:
the impact of good management
Healthcare spending in the world’s richest countries continues to rise along with
patients’ expectations, yet the sector still lags behind in terms of raising its
productivity. CEP research highlights the potential of improving management
practices in hospitals as a strategy for meeting these challenges.
in brief...
9are within rather than between countries – over 80% of
the management differences are across hospitals within
the same country. Even in a publicly dominated
healthcare sector like the NHS, there is wide variation in
management scores, with the lower performing ‘tail’ of
hospitals driving down the country average.
The research identifies three main ‘drivers’ that 
account for many of the differences in management
practices: competition, scale and skills. These mirror
similar results from CEP’s work on management practices
in the private sector, highlighting a consistent set of
factors that seem to be related to enhanced
management.
 Competition: there is strong evidence that hospitals
where managers perceive higher levels of competition
from neighbouring rival hospitals are much better
managed than those that consider fewer potential
alternatives for patients to choose.
 Scale: larger hospitals, exhibit much better
management than smaller hospitals. To some extent, this
reflects economies of scale in management.
 Skills: hospitals with more clinically trained
managers achieve higher management scores across all
countries. This is probably because such managers are
able to ‘speak the same language’ as clinical staff, which
not only enhances communication but also allows them
to enjoy credibility and authority that is difficult for non-
clinical managers to attain.
The research highlights the opportunity for improving
hospital performance through better management
practices. For example, policy-makers should examine the
benefits of fostering competition between providers as a
powerful mechanism for improvement. This can be
achieved by increasing patient choice, encouraging new
entrants and relaxing restrictions on hospital growth.
In terms of skills, people who combine clinical and
managerial skills are clearly the key to better performance.
Boosting the proportion of managers with clinical skills –
via more attractive career paths for clinicians into
management – could be one way of addressing the UK’s
comparatively poor showing in this area. Academic Health
Science Centres, especially those connected to leading
business schools, could play an important role here by
developing a cadre of competent clinical managers. 
Meanwhile, healthcare commissioners should consider
how they gain access to top performing hospitals for their
patients. In an era of GP commissioning and patient
choice, this may become particularly important for
attracting and retaining patients and the funding that
comes with them. At the same time, the need for
hospitals to improve management practices could create
new opportunities for suppliers and new entrants.
Finally, patients should understand that some hospitals are
simply better managed, provide better care and are safer
than others. They should take advantage of published
information on hospitals’ performance (such as NHS
Choices) and consider their options for care.
This article summarises Management in Healthcare: Why Good
Practice Really Matters by Stephen Dorgan, Dennis Layton,
Nicholas Bloom, Rebecca Homkes, Raffaella Sadun and 
John Van Reenen (http://cep.lse.ac.uk/textonly/_new/research/
productivity/management/PDF/Management_in_Healthcare_
Report.pdf).
Stephen Dorgan and Dennis Layton are at McKinsey &
Company. Nicholas Bloom is at Stanford University. Raffaella
Sadun is at Harvard Business School. Rebecca Homkes and
John Van Reenen are at CEP.
Fostering competition
between hospitals could
be a powerful
mechanism for
improving the quality 
of management
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In the latest of CEP’s ‘big ideas’ series,
Henry Overman sketches the evolution of
the Centre’s research on economic
geography and its interactions with policy
debates about global inequality, European
integration and urban and regional policy.
E
conomic prosperity is very
unevenly distributed across
space. Understanding the
reasons for these differences
and trying to formulate the appropriate
policy responses have been a focus of CEP
research for nearly 20 years.
Initially, this interest focused around
the theoretical development of the so-
called ‘new economic geography’ (NEG).
Starting with early work by the 2008
Nobel laureate Paul Krugman, NEG
attempted to integrate insights from the
fields of international trade and economic
geography to understand how large
spatial disparities might emerge between
regions that started off identical
(Krugman, 1991).
To have spatial disparities emerge
‘endogenously’, the workings of the
economy need to reinforce any small
advantages that one region has so that
spatial disparities become self-reinforcing.
Economic geography had long been
interested in the idea that cumulative
causation (the idea that small differences
may be self-reinforcing) could help to
explain large spatial disparities. What the
NEG did was to develop the first micro-
founded model that formalised these ideas
– a model that started with self-interested
optimising firms and workers as economic
actors and built up from individual choices
to generate overall spatial disparities.
This model put economic interactions
between firms and their consumers at the
core of understanding spatial outcomes.
Transaction costs (of doing business across
space) meant that firms would benefit
from locating in larger markets to be near
to their customers but this would come at
a price in the form of greater competition
from other firms already located there.
Location decisions depended on the
trade-off between these costs and
benefits. As transaction costs fell, the
balance of these costs and benefits
changed and the resulting relocation of
firms and workers could change regional
economic outcomes, separating initially
identical regions into a ‘core’ and
‘periphery’.
Tony Venables (director of CEP’s
globalisation programme from 1992 to
2005) worked with Paul Krugman to
develop further insights from NEG.
Their joint article in 1995
emphasised the role of firms as
both suppliers and customers and
showed that this could once again explain
the emergence of a core-periphery pattern
as transport costs fell. Crucially, however,
this model also suggested that as
transport costs continue to fall, a second
Economic 
geography
Big ideas
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Economic geography seeks
to understand why
prosperity is so unevenly
distributed across cities,
regions and nations
stage of adjustment could occur when the
market worked to undermine the core-
periphery pattern and reduce disparities
between rich and poor places. 
Krugman and Venables (1995) used
this model to explain the history of
globalisation: falling transport costs initially
benefited the UK and Europe (during the
Industrial Revolution), but that pattern is
now slowly unravelling as transport costs
continue to fall, boosting the economic
performance of Asian countries including
China and India.
The following year, a paper by Tony
Venables extended the range of economic
interactions to consider more carefully the
input-output relationships between firms.
When firms in one industry need to buy
and sell from firms in a small number of
related industries (for example, car makers
need to buy steel), then these firms
benefit from locating close together. On
the other hand, locating near industries
with which they have no connection
(such as food processing) delivers no
benefits but drives up the costs of
production through competition for scarce
local resources, such as land
As a result such interactions lead to
the emergence of specialised regional
economies – with steel makers and
car producers locating in different places
from food producers and food processors
(Venables, 1996). Throughout the
second half of the 1990s, 
CEP-based PhD students
(including Mary Amiti, Gilles
Duranton and Diego Puga) helped
deepen and extend the insights
emerging from these models.
At the same time as these
theoretical models were being
developed, policy-makers were becoming
CentrePiece Winter 2010/11
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increasingly interested in the likely spatial
effects of further European integration. In
particular, they wanted to know whether
further integration would reinforce
existing disparities and whether it might
lead countries to become increasingly
specialised. The first question was seen as
crucial to understanding the likely effects
of the single European market, while the
second had implications for the
functioning of a future single European
currency. NEG provided new perspectives
on these questions.
Clearly, however, theory could only
take us so far in understanding the likely
effects, and so the emphasis began to
shift towards empirical work to get at the
real world implications. CEP researchers
worked closely with the European
Commission to analyse the factors
affecting the location of activities within
the European Union (EU) – Midelfart et 
al (2004). 
We found that both comparative
advantage (for example, the availability of
highly skilled labour) and economic
geography (for example, the centrality of
an EU country) determined what activity
was located where in the EU. This raised
the possibility that further European
integration might actually exacerbate
initial differences with important
implications for which areas might see
most benefits.
We also used insights from NEG to
help assess the impact of the EU’s
‘cohesion fund’ expenditures on new
transport infrastructure in Spain,
Greece, Portugal and Ireland, as
well as advising the UK
government on the likely wider
economic impact of building new roads.
Again, one of the crucial insights to
Insights from economic
geography have helped
assess the impact of new
transport infrastructure
across Europe
emerge was that, contrary to conventional
wisdom, building new roads connecting to
more peripheral areas could actually
exacerbate rather than correct existing
inequalities.
This emphasis on empirical work to
help inform policy fed back, in turn, to the
direction that research took in the Centre
in the early 2000s. In 2004, Tony Venables
and Stephen Redding (director of CEP’s
globalisation programme from 2005 to
2010) provided one of the first empirical
tests of predictions from NEG models and
showed the role of market access in
CentrePiece Winter 2010/11
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a role in increasing obesity – it doesn’t!
(Eid et al, 2008).
As with CEP’s earlier work on NEG,
our research on urban economics has
become increasingly focused on the policy
implications of our findings. This
increased policy focus culminated in 2008
with the formation of a new Spatial
Economics Research Centre (SERC) at LSE.
SERC, which is jointly funded by the
Departments of Business, Innovation and
Skills and Communities and Local
Government, the Economic and Social
Research Council and the Welsh Assembly
Government, aims to provide a rigorous
understanding of the nature, extent,
causes and consequences of economic
disparities in the UK, and to identify
appropriate policy responses. CEP and
SERC researchers now work closely
together, building on international
evidence and nearly 20 years of CEP
research, to help improve urban and
regional policy at both the national and
local levels.
Henry Overman is director of SERC,
professor of economic geography in LSE’s
department of geography and environment
and a research associate in CEP’s
globalisation programme.
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shaping international disparities in
incomes (Redding and Venables, 2004).
CEP researchers continue to work on
tests of these models with particular
emphasis on the use of natural
experiments to break through the chain of
circular causality and to isolate more
clearly the impact of market access. For
example, Stephen Redding and Daniel
Sturm (2008) used NEG to explain how
the Iron Curtain fundamentally changed
the economic geography of West
Germany (moving the centre of gravity
further to the west of the country) and to
consider the possible impact of
reunification.
At the same time as this new
empirical focus was developing, CEP
researchers continued to build theoretical
models that increased our understanding
of the implications of NEG. For example,
work by Frédéric Robert-Nicoud and co-
authors suggested that the costs and
benefits of different patterns of activity
were very hard to assess but that there
were some reasons to think that
economic activity might tend to be
excessively spatially concentrated. 
The early 2000s also saw CEP
researchers on economic geography
branching out in two other directions.
Tony Venables was becoming interested in
the causes and consequences of spatial
disparities in developing countries, which
would lead him to take up the position of
chief economist at the Department for
International Development for the period
2005-08 (Venables, 2005).
Meanwhile, Gilles Duranton, Diego
Puga and I were focusing increasingly on
the economics of cities and the insights
that emerged from the field of urban
economics (for example, Burchfield et al,
2006, and Duranton and Overman, 2008).
In a series of papers, we (and
various co-authors) tried to answer a
number of questions, including the role
of urban diversity in the innovation
process (it matters a lot during the
‘nursery’ stage when firms are just
getting started), the extent to which
economic activity is actually spatially
concentrated (much less than many
governments seem to believe)
and what causes urban sprawl
in the United States (geology,
climate, public transport and 
policy all play a role). We even
studied whether urban sprawl plays 
President Obama recently proposed increasing the
generosity of the US tax credit system for corporate
spending on research and development (R&D) and
making it a permanent feature of the US tax code. 
This was justified by the idea that more R&D would lead
to growth, not just worldwide but particularly in the
United States.
But such a bold claim raises some fundamental questions:
does the location of R&D matter? Will a firm be more
productive if it locates in one region rather than another?
And do R&D ‘spillovers’ – the benefits to firms other than
the company spending its money on R&D – decline with
distance and, if so, how quickly?
The answers are important for several reasons, most
notably for understanding regional growth. If
geographical spillovers are confined to narrow
geographical markets, growth rates will diverge, poor
regions will get poorer and rich ones will get richer.
Few doubt that, in the long run, new and better products
and processes are stronger determinants of firm growth
than growth in demand for existing products. Given the
importance of this issue, it is not surprising that
economists have studied the link between a firm's R&D
and its productivity.
Equally if not more important is the fact that not only
does a firm's research affect its own productivity, but
there are also significant spillovers from the R&D efforts
of other firms. This idea, which is at the heart of modern
growth theory, dates back to the 1960s and attempts
were first made to quantify the impact in the 1970s. Our
research puts a new twist on the hunt for R&D spillovers,
focusing on geography.
In the analytical framework we use, a firm’s productivity is
a function of its own knowledge and the ‘spillover pool’, a
weighted average of other firms' knowledge. To work out
which firms benefit from R&D spillovers, we have to figure
out which ones are close ‘neighbours’. This boils down to
working out some distance ‘weights’ – the bigger the
weight, the closer you are, and thus the more likely you
are to benefit from a neighbouring firm’s research. So for
firms in California, it matters whether you are located in
Silicon Valley or near Yosemite National Park! 
These weights thus play two roles: they determine both
the set of firms that contribute to the spillover pool and
the relative importance of the firms within that set. For
CentrePiece Winter 2010/11
Location, location, location:
why geography matters for R&D
A key insight of economic geography is that proximity is good for
productivity. Research by John Van Reenen and colleagues explores this
relationship in the context of corporate research labs, revealing a strong
link between R&D and growth driven by ‘knowledge spillovers’ between
firms located close to each other.
in brief...
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A firm whose inventors
are close to other firms’
R&D will benefit a lot
more from new ideas
example, in the geographical context of the United
States, we might limit attention to firms that are in the
same state and weight those firms by their geographical
distance from the firm doing the R&D. 
But there are channels other than geography that affect
R&D spillovers. For example, firms that perform R&D in
similar technology classes might benefit from each 
other’s efforts (‘technological spillovers’). On the other
hand, firms that produce similar products might actually
be hurt by the R&D efforts of product market rivals as
these competitors will steal business from them if they
innovate successfully. 
Moreover, these spillover links are not independent. For
example, firms in the same geographical region might
perform R&D in similar technology classes, as in Silicon
Valley. Our research assesses all three channels
simultaneously. Although we focus on geographical
spillovers, we control for technological spillovers and
business-stealing effects. 
We postulate that inventors are more likely to 
be sources of spillovers than top management. Although
for many small firms the locations of corporate
headquarters and research labs are highly correlated,
many large firms have several labs in different locations
so taking account only of headquarters could severely
underestimate the importance of inventors learning from
neighbouring inventors.
Our research indicates that the locations of researchers
are indeed more important than the locations of
headquarters, but both have explanatory power.
Furthermore, the effects of R&D fall with distance, and
geographical R&D markets are very local. 
We conclude that location does matter. There is a strong
link between R&D and growth through knowledge
‘spilling over’ between firms. Among other things, this
means that research will generally be under-provided by
the market. 
But the process of R&D spillovers driving growth has an
important geographical element: having your inventors
close to where the R&D is occurring means that you
benefit a lot more from new ideas. This is why local
policy-makers like to attract R&D facilities into their areas,
but it is also why regional economic convergence, if it
occurs, is often so slow.
Our findings are complementary to those of Michael
Greenstone and colleagues (2010), who find that locating
a large new plant in a region increases the productivity of
other plants in that region. Moreover, our research
provides an explanation for the findings of Daniel Wilson
(2008), who documents that local policy-makers invest
substantial sums in the form of tax incentives to attract
R&D labs to their regions.
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This article summarises ‘Spillovers in Space: Does Geography
Matter?’; by Sergey Lychagin, Joris Pinkse, Margaret Slade 
and John Van Reenen, CEP Discussion Paper No. 991
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp0991.pdf).
Sergey Lychagin and Joris Pinkse are at Pennsylvania State
University. Margaret Slade is at the University of British
Columbia. John Van Reenen is director of CEP.
Further reading
Michael Greenstone, Richard Hornbeck and Enrico Moretti
(2010) ‘Identifying Agglomeration Spillovers: Evidence from
Winners and Losers of Large Plant Openings’, Journal of
Political Economy 118(3): 536-98
Daniel Wilson (2009) ‘Beggar thy Neighbor? The In-state, Out-
of-state and Aggregate Effects of R&D Tax Credits’, Review of
Economics and Statistics 91(2): 431-6
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Geographical growth
spillovers explain why
local policy-makers
compete to attract
corporate R&D labs to
their regions
I
t was widely expected that London
would be the most severely hit of
the UK regions in the recession
brought about by the 2007-08
financial crisis. London was more reliant
on financial services, it was argued, and
because financial services were most
directly affected, incomes and
employment were expected to fall harder
than in other cities.
But this has not turned out to be the
case: both income and employment in
London have fared better than expected.
The latest data show that London’s income
per capita fell by 2.5% between 2008 and
2009, while it fell by 2.9% in England as a
whole. Only the North East and North West
had lower falls than London, at around 2%
(see Figure 1). But between 2007 and
2008, London grew nearly twice as fast as
those two regions and, of course, London
was already much richer. In terms of
employment, the UK saw peak-to-trough
falls of 3.9%, whereas London saw only 
a 2.6% fall.
House prices tell a similar story. Data
from the Department for Communities and
Local Government shows that between
March 2008 and December 2010, house
prices rose 1.4% in London, compared with
a fall of 1.2% in the South East. The
Midlands and Northern regions saw falls in
excess of 3.5% while in Yorkshire house
prices fell 6.1%. 
There were also many other signs that
the capital was holding up and that
Londoners were happier than ever to spend
on luxuries. There was a growth in theatre
box office takings between 2008 and 2009.
And between 2007 and 2010, the average
attendance at Premiership football matches
in London was flat, while it fell by 6% in
the Midlands and by 5% in the North. As a
colleague remarked, ‘it feels like London
got away with it’.
But if London did get away with it,
how did it do it? One crucial factor is that
the recession has not been as bad for the
middle classes as expected. According to
the Labour Force Survey, for England as a
whole, professional and service occupations
were less badly affected than
administrative, trade and basic occupations.
This helps the South as professional
occupations account for a larger proportion
How did
London 
get away 
with it? 
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When the recession hit, many predicted that
London would fare the worst. Henry Overman
explores how in fact the capital’s economy
suffered far less than the rest of the country.
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Figure 1:
Growth in UK regions in 2008 and 2009
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of the labour force – nearly 50%,
compared with under 40% in the Midlands
and the North.
Reinforcing this overall trend, London’s
employment in professional occupations
held up particularly well and London also
performed better in administrative, trade
and service occupations. Only in the lower
skilled occupations did London fare worse.
Understanding why the professions
fared better in London than in the rest of
the UK is difficult. It’s unlikely to be
explained by public sector employment.
Only in the South East does public sector
employment account for a lower share of
the economy. The same is true for public
sector expenditure as a percentage of
overall expenditure. An outflow of illegal
immigrants, differences in the effect on
hours worked and real wages may all have
played a minor role.
London has higher house prices, so the
impact of interest rates on mortgage
payments has been larger. But as with fiscal
policy, relative to expenditure there is not a
big differential with the rest of the country.
In contrast, the impact on the very wealthy
probably worked against London. The
overall wealth of the UK’s richest 1,000
people fell by £77 billion between 2007
and 2009. 
Could the bailout of the banks have
played a role? Again this is a surprisingly
difficult question to answer since the Office
for National Statistics has not yet produced
the regional distribution of jobs directly
affected by the government bailout of the
banks. Nevertheless, if we look at what
happened to public sector employment by
region, we find that the timing of when
these workers became reclassified gives a
rough answer to the question. It suggests
that London had the highest share of
‘bailout’ jobs: around 16% of the 220,000
jobs affected.
Turning to the indirect effect of bank
bailouts, Andrew Haldane of the Bank of
England estimates that reduced risk
because of government measures 
saved the banks £107 billion in interest
costs in 2009. More than 90% of this went
to the big five – HSBC, Barclays, RBS, HBOS
and Lloyds – all of which are
disproportionately represented in London.
We do not yet know the impact of this on
the London economy. 
At least one other government
intervention also disproportionately
benefited London. The Olympic site
currently employs 10,000 workers, and
Crossrail a further 2,000. The effect of
these interventions can be seen in the
employment numbers. According to the
Workforce Jobs survey, between 2007 and
2010 employment in construction fell by
twice as much in the North as it did in the
South East: 16% versus 8%. At the same
time, while employment in financial services
fell by 10% in the North, it rose by 5% in
the South East. 
So where does all of this leave us? First,
relative to expectations and relative to other
regions of the UK, London appears to have
got away with it. The over-representation of
the professional occupations partly explains
this. The bailout may explain why these
occupations did even better in London. But
other explanations are possible.
The shift in financial sector employment
may be driven by the increased importance
of timely information flows when things
turn bad. Despite improvements in
information and communications
technology, economists still think that
spatial proximity plays an important role in
exchanging information.
Alternatively, London may be benefiting
from the depth and breadth of its labour
market. SERC research suggests London 
has a higher concentration of the most
talented people than other metropolitan
areas in the UK (Gibbons et al, 2010). 
There is more research to be done to
understand whether these economic
mechanisms have played a role.
Finally, there are three important things
to note. First, to the extent that the bailout
of the banking sector explains London’s
performance, Boris Johnson may be right to
worry about ‘banker bashing’.
Second, despite its relatively good
performance, London has still experienced
a recession and growth continues to be
sluggish. The latest growth figures suggest
that the UK may have experienced no
growth in the final quarter of 2010. The
tightening of fiscal policy, public sector job
cuts and potential rises in interest rates all
pose risks for the recovery and London is
certainly not immune to these risks, even if
it may be better placed to cope than other
parts of the UK. 
Third, some Londoners didn’t get away
with it: the bottom end of the London
labour market (the 15% of the labour
force with the lowest skills) has seen falls
in employment in line with the UK
average. This contrasts with other broad
occupational categories all of which did
better in London. Housing (and other)
benefit reforms will hit London and the
South East particularly hard. London 
may have got away with it so far, but
things certainly do not look so rosy for
London’s poor.
Henry Overman is director of SERC.
Further reading
Steve Gibbons, Henry Overman and Panu
Pelkonen (2010) ‘Wage Disparities in Britain:
People or Place?’, SERC Discussion Paper No.
60 (http://spatial economics.ac.uk/textonly/
SERC/publications/download/sercdp0060.pdf)
London may
have got away
with it so far, but
things do not
look so rosy for
London’s poor
London’s economy
benefited from the
over representation 
of professional
occupations, which
have been less 
badly affected 
by the recession 
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Chris Pissarides,
Nobel laureate
Most market transactions are characterised by various
forms of imperfections or ‘frictions’. The importance of
these frictions in driving market outcomes is a key issue
for understanding such diverse markets as those for a job,
a house and a spouse.
While a given market may have buyers and sellers who
can in principle agree on a price, this may be insufficient
for immediate trade to take place. Both buyers and sellers
may need to invest in a costly and time-consuming
process of search to locate and assess matching partners,
and they eventually need to agree to enter a transaction
rather than wait for better trading opportunities.
Search theory – for which Chris Pissarides, Dale Mortensen
and Peter Diamond have been honoured with the 2010
Nobel Prize in Economics – provides a versatile framework
for understanding market outcomes in a variety of
situations in which trade is complex. One key lesson of the
theory is that with search frictions, not all markets will
clear at all points in time – some buyers and/or sellers
remain unmatched.
Another important implication of search theory is that
when access to information is costly and trade
opportunities are infrequent, not all traders may trade at
the same market price, leading to dispersion in prices.
Finally, market outcomes may be inefficient if individuals
engage in ‘too much’ or ‘too little’ search, in which case
policy intervention may improve on what can be achieved
through markets alone.
Although economists have long been aware of the
importance of frictions (see, for example, Hicks, 1932),
these frictions were not brought into formal models until
the work of the three Nobel laureates and a few other
researchers in the 1970s. Since then, they have generated
an incredibly large and ever growing literature, addressing
the role of frictions in many ‘real world’ markets.
In the labour market, frictions are used to explain the
existence of unemployment and wage inequality. In
business cycle models, they are used to explain the
amplification of the response of employment to
aggregate shocks. In monetary models, they are used to
explain the existence of money. In the housing market,
they are used to explain residential choices and
fluctuations in house prices. And in the marriage market,
they are used to explain dating, marriage, fertility and
divorce behaviour. 
By far the most influential application of search theory
has been to the labour market, and it has led to the
development of what is now recognised as the leading
model of ‘equilibrium unemployment’. This is the area in
which Chris Pissarides, former director of CEP’s
macroeconomics programme, made his main
contributions to search theory. His seminal work on the
functioning of labour markets with frictions appeared in a
number of articles in the late 1970s and 1980s, and was
later organised in a unified framework in a book that has
become a key reference in modern labour market analysis
(Pissarides, 1990).
The central idea is that trade in the labour market is
uncoordinated, time-consuming and costly for both firms
and workers. Workers need to spend time and resources
to find suitable job opportunities; and firms need to
spend time and resources to locate and screen job
applicants. While the idea that trade in the labour market
is complex is widely accepted these days, when search
models of unemployment were first developed, they
The 2010 Nobel Prize in Economics was
awarded to CEP’s Chris Pissarides,
jointly with Peter Diamond and Dale
Mortensen, ‘for their analysis of markets
with search frictions’. As Barbara
Petrongolo explains, their research has
deeply enhanced our understanding of  
how labour markets work and how
policy-makers should respond.
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implied a clear break with the perfectly competitive view
of equilibrium in the labour market, which hinges on
frictionless trade. 
In a perfectly competitive labour market firms and
workers meet costlessly and trade at a single wage, and
any excess labour supply is absorbed instantaneously
through a fall in the equilibrium wage. Most economists
would argue that the functioning of the labour market is
far more complex than this. In particular, the competitive
model fails to explain such stylised facts as persistent
unemployment, wage differentials among otherwise
similar workers and the co-existence of unemployed
workers and job vacancies.
By introducing realistic frictions, the search approach has
developed an elegant framework that allows us to
explain key stylised facts about the labour market and
ultimately think about unemployment and wages in a
new light. For example, a direct consequence of frictions
is that as markets typically do not clear, unemployed
workers and job vacancies may co-exist, even within very
narrowly defined labour market segments.
In particular, unemployment persists in equilibrium
because before all unemployed workers find new jobs,
some of the existing jobs come to an end, providing a
new inflow into unemployment. This suggests that after
an adverse economic shock, it takes time to bring back
unemployment to the pre-shock level. So recovery after a
recession may be slow, even once new job opportunities
start to emerge. 
An important implication of job search frictions is that
existing jobs produce ‘rents’. This means that if an
employer and a worker are separated for reasons outside
their control, at least one (and often both) of them is
worse off. Rents give employers some degree of market
power over their employees, which means that unlike in
the perfectly competitive model, small wage cuts do not
induce all employees to quit their jobs, simply because
better paid jobs elsewhere in the economy are hard to
find. As a corollary, workers of similar quality may be paid
different wages if employed in different firms.
Search models have also been used to understand how
aggregate shocks are transmitted to the labour market
via the response of job creation and job destruction, and
how shocks drive cyclical fluctuations in unemployment.
Chris Pissarides has made the two key contributions in
this area.
The first is his seminal search-theoretic analysis of the
dynamics of unemployment, vacancies and real wages
(Pissarides, 1985), which illustrates the asymmetric
behaviour of unemployment following positive and
negative shocks. He shows that the rise in unemployment
in a recession will be faster than its fall in an
expansionary phase, because while an adverse shock
results in an immediate increase in job separations, a
positive shock only leads to a gradual fall in
unemployment because the hiring process is time-
consuming.
The second key contribution is his most famous article,
written jointly with Dale Mortensen (Mortensen and
Pissarides, 1994). This work illustrates how firms respond
to shocks to aggregate productivity in making their
decisions about creating new jobs and ending existing job
matches – and thus produce cyclical fluctuations in job
flows and unemployment.
The core theoretical work on labour markets with search
frictions has been accompanied by a number of
contributions focusing on policy analysis and empirical
evidence. It has become common practice in the
literature to adopt a search framework to analyse the
impact of unemployment compensation, hiring and firing
costs, minimum wages, and taxes on unemployment and
the wage distribution. Empirical work has addressed the
implications of search models for individual labour market
transitions, aggregate job and worker flows,
unemployment dynamics and the wage distribution. 
The work of Chris Pissarides and his fellow Nobel
laureates has deeply influenced the view of modern labour
markets of both academics and policy-makers and has
stimulated several continuing streams of work at CEP. 
As many countries are facing the consequences of the
most severe recession of the post-war era, the latest 
Nobel Prize is an award to research on fundamental
economic issues that are both at the core of the wellbeing
of society at large and very high on the policy agenda of
the moment.
Barbara Petrongolo is a professor of economics at Queen
Mary, University of London, and a research associate in 
CEP’s labour markets programme.
Further reading
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In a world of financial globalisation, foreign
investors benefit from bank bailouts in response
to a crisis. Research by Friederike Niepmann
and Tim Schmidt-Eisenlohr explores the
incentives for governments to act in these
circumstances – and the role of international
cooperation over financial regulation and crisis
management.
Bank bailouts in 
a global economy:
the challenges for international cooperation
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S
evere financial crises followed
by costly government
interventions are not a new
phenomenon. Indeed, in the
last 30 years, financial crises have occurred
frequently: one study counts 117 systemic
banking crises in 93 countries between
the late 1970s and the early 2000s (Caprio
and Klingebiel, 2003). And the costs to
the public purse are usually considerable:
on average, governments spend 12.8% 
of their country’s GDP on interventions 
to restore financial stability (Reinhart 
and Rogoff, 2009, and Honohan and
Klingebiel, 2000). 
Compared with the more regulated
era following the Great Depression, the
new feature of crises today is that they are
rarely local and often involve banks and
consumers worldwide. Two aspects of
financial globalisation have been driving
this. First, the balance sheets of financial
institutions have become increasingly
linked internationally. As a result, a crisis
can spread rapidly from the financial
sector of one country to other countries –
a phenomenon known as ‘contagion’.
Second, there has been a steep rise in
cross-border banking. In a world of global
finance, investors from many different
countries are directly affected when a
bank is in distress. This poses new
challenges for policy-makers responding to
financial crises. Their decisions have effects
both at home and abroad. At the same
time, domestic economic outcomes often
depend on interventions by foreign
governments. 
The recent financial crisis has shown
how this international dimension to policy
interventions can lead to conflicts of
interest between countries. One
prominent example is the bailout of AIG,
an American insurance company with
significant global business, which received
large-scale support from the US
government in September 2008.
The AIG intervention, the cost of
which will eventually accrue to US
taxpayers, benefitted foreign financial
institutions substantially. The asymmetry
between those who paid for the
intervention and those who gained from 
it caused much political debate in the
United States.
Another example is the Icelandic bank
Icesave, in which many UK and Dutch
consumers had invested their savings.
When the bank went bankrupt in 
2008, the Icelandic government did not
compensate all creditors, but only
absorbed the losses of its own nationals.
This caused a severe political confrontation
between the UK, the Netherlands 
and Iceland, culminating in the UK
government’s application of the 
Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act to
freeze Icelandic assets in the UK.
In our research, we formally study the
problems that arise when banks operate
across borders while government
intervention is still limited by national
borders. We are interested in how
governments should deal with banks in
distress when their potential bankruptcy
affects depositors from different countries
and international balance sheet
connections can lead to cross-border
contagion.
If governments do not cooperate
when dealing with an international crisis
but instead behave strategically, this can
lead to decisions that are ‘sub-optimal’
from a global perspective. Different
institutional arrangements that allow
governments to cooperate within well
specified rules could address this concern
and improve global crisis management.
Much research has been conducted on
financial crises and interventions that are
contained within one country, whereas the
international aspects of crises and
interventions have received far less
attention. Two studies have made the case
that cooperation between governments
can be beneficial when financial stability is
a public good that is shared across
countries (Freixas, 2003, and Goodhart
and Schoenmaker, 2009).
Until now, there has been no analysis
that explicitly considers the effects of
international financial linkages on
governments’ incentives to intervene, and
which derives the costs and benefits of a
bailout from the fundamentals of a
country’s economy. Our research provides
a first step to filling this gap. 
When a government decides whether
Problems arise
when banks
operate across
borders while
government
intervention is
still limited by
national borders
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to support a domestic bank in distress
with taxpayer funds, it has to strike the
right balance between creating distortions
in taxation, containing losses from forced
liquidation of bank assets and limiting
financial penalties for depositors and
resulting income inequalities. From a
global perspective, the optimal decision
requires taking account of additional
considerations: contagion effects across
borders, losses incurred by depositors
worldwide as well as the costs to
taxpayers in different countries from
financing bailouts.
Governments care predominantly
about the wellbeing of their own citizens.
When they deal with a financial crisis on
their own without cooperating with other
governments, crisis management can be
sub-optimal for three reasons:
 First, policy-makers do not take
account of the positive effects of their
actions on the wellbeing of foreign
nationals.
 Second, a country may behave
opportunistically: anticipating another
country’s intervention, it may decide not
to act itself and thereby spare its
taxpayers.
 Third, governments typically do not
split the costs of bailouts.
By taking a closer look at events in the
recent crisis, we can learn about the
relevance of these three sources of
inefficiency. For example, in September
2008, the US treasury decided against a
bailout of Lehman Brothers. This triggered
worldwide financial distress and
governments in many countries eventually
gave failing financial institutions within
their jurisdictions large financial support. 
If there had been stronger incentives for
the US government to take account of
these cross-border effects, it might have
been more inclined to decide in favour of
a bailout.
Shortly after Lehman's bankruptcy, the
US Federal Reserve supported AIG.
Without this measure, several foreign
financial institutions would probably have
suffered severe losses, which might have
made government intervention in other
countries necessary. While financial
contributions by other countries were
taken into consideration, ultimately no
overseas governments helped to finance
the AIG bailout. Our analysis suggests
that, anticipating that the US government
would support AIG anyway, other
countries were ‘free-riding’ on the bailout.
In the case of Icesave, the cost of
providing deposit insurance to all
depositors would have been very high for
the relatively small Icelandic population
given the large size of liabilities.
Compensating all depositors by sharing
the costs between the UK, the
Netherlands and Iceland was not
considered an option.
When is cooperation between
governments especially important?
Increased interbank linkages make
cooperation more important as they
increase the extent of cross-border
contagion. Yet internationalisation in
another dimension can reduce the need
for more cooperation: if consumers
deposit more of their funds abroad,
governments start to care about the
health of foreign banks too.
As a consequence of the recent crisis,
there is a worldwide debate on how to
improve global crisis management. Our
research contributes to this debate by
studying different cooperation regimes
and analysing which countries gain or lose
from them. Political efforts to improve
international cooperation have led to the
creation of some new institutions, which
roughly correspond to the ones that we
consider. 
For example, the members of the
Nordic-Baltic Stability Group, created in
August 2010, have agreed to share not
only information but also the costs of
intervention in the event of a future crisis.
The group corresponds to what we call a
central authority with fiscal power. It can
decide whether a bailout of a bank in
distress is undertaken and how the
resulting costs are shared between
countries.
Our analysis shows that with such an
arrangement, there is no guarantee that at
least one country gains from cooperation
while no country loses. This may limit the
willingness of countries to stick to the
agreement when a crisis actually happens.
Another example is the European
Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), a European
Union institution recently established with
the task (among other things) of issuing
recommendations on how to deal with
banks in distress. So far, the ESRB only has
reputational power. Our analysis may help
explain why: a central authority that can
Restricting
banks’
cross-border
operations may
reduce the risk
of contagion, but
such regulations
have other costs
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prescribe a bailout, which then has to be
financed by one country alone, always
makes that country worse off compared
with a situation where decisions are 
taken unilaterally. 
The willingness of policy-makers to
agree in advance on institutions for crisis
management and sharing rules for the
costs of future interventions is also limited
because of concerns related to ‘moral
hazard’. It is widely agreed that implicit
bailout guarantees – that is, expectations
among some banks and investors that
they will be bailed out if the worst comes
to the worst – led to excessive risk-taking
in the run-up to the recent crisis. Explicit
guarantees could worsen this problem in
the future. 
As an alternative to formal
cooperation, structural reforms of the
financial and banking system are being
discussed so as to avoid international
conflicts in the first place. Restricting the
cross-border operations of banks may help
to reduce the risk of international
contagion. It may also counteract the
divergence between which national
authorities have the power to intervene in
case of distress and which country’s
citizens have the major stake in the
institution concerned. Yet regulations have
other costs, such as limiting risk-sharing
between countries and reducing
international competition among financial
institutions.
Financial reform will continue over the
next few years. Finding the right balance
between the efficiency gains from financial
globalisation, the preservation of national
sovereignty and optimal cooperation when
managing a crisis will remain a challenging
task for policy-makers worldwide.
This article summarises ‘Bank Bailouts,
International Linkages and Cooperation’ by
Friederike Niepmann and Tim Schmidt-
Eisenlohr, CEP Discussion Paper No. 1023
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/
dp1023.pdf).
Friederike Niepmann is a visitor in 
CEP’s globalisation programme and a 
PhD candidate at the European 
University Institute in Florence.
Tim Schmidt-Eisenlohr is at the Centre for
Business Taxation, University of Oxford.
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The key is to find the right balance
between financial globalisation,
national sovereignty and optimal
cooperation in crisis management
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W
orld trade in
manufactured goods fell
by about 30% between
the first half of 2008 and
the first half of 2009. This trade collapse
exceeded the fall in global GDP as well as
the trade fall predicted by many standard
economic models.
Explanations abound, as illustrated by
the comprehensive discussion in the
volume of studies edited by Richard
Baldwin (2009). Some emphasise a crisis
of the supply side of trade, citing such
causes as a shortage of trade finance,
disruption of global value chains and
increased barriers to trade as governments
implemented protectionist measures. For
others, the fall in trade is simply the
flipside of a fall in the demand for
manufactured goods, postponed
purchases of intermediate goods and the
drawing down of inventories.
Which explanations turn out to be
correct? Analyses at the aggregate level
and/or the level of broad product
categories are not well suited to providing
a clear answer to this question because
the different effects and margins of trade
adjustment cannot be separately
identified. Econometric analysis of firm-
level data is therefore critical to
discriminate between alternative
explanations.
Yet despite a wealth of statistical
analysis, econometric work on firm-level
data is scarce. To the best of our
knowledge, only one study makes use of
some firm-level data, examining the fall in
French trade among various classes of
exporter size and various sectors that
depend to different degrees on external
finance (Bricongne et al, 2009). But the
study does not exploit individual firm
characteristics to discriminate between
different explanations for the trade
collapse.
Our research tries to fill this gap, using
data on Belgian exports and imports at the
firm-product-country level as well as a
wealth of balance sheet information. We
compare the first half of 2008 and the
first half of 2009 as Belgium’s trade
collapse started in November 2008. Four
key findings stand out, which together
World trade fell dramatically in 2009 after the
financial crisis worsened in the autumn of 2008.
According to research by Giordano Mion and
colleagues, the trade collapse reflected a steep
drop in global demand rather than something
specific to trade, such as growing protectionist
measures. This was not a crisis of international
trade itself.
Trade
crisis– what trade crisis?
The trade
collapse was
driven by
changes in prices
and quantities
rather than
changes in
numbers of
active firms,
products traded
and national
markets served
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lead us to conclude
that the trade collapse
did not result from a crisis of
international trade itself:
 First, the fall in trade
overwhelmingly occurred at the ‘intensive
margin’ – that is, in the prices that trading
firms charged and the quantities they sold
– rather than at the ‘extensive margin’ –
that is, in the number of firms involved in
trade and the range of products they sold
and national markets they served.
 Second, the fall in demand for
tradable goods – which particularly
affected durables and intermediate goods
– represents the most important
explanation for the decline in the 
intensive margin, contributing 70-80% of
the total fall.
 Third, although trade finance and
involvement in global value chains played
some role in the reduction of trade, they
affected domestic operations in a roughly
similar way. 
 Fourth, percentage changes in
exports and imports did not systematically
deviate from changes in turnover and
intermediate consumption respectively. 
A fall at the intensive 
margin of trade
Which margins mattered most for the
2009 trade collapse: firm entry or exit;
adding or dropping products and markets;
or price and quantity adjustments? The
answer to this question is important:
changes at the intensive margin (where
firms reduce prices and quantities within
existing trading relationships) are likely to
be less durable and less costly than
changes at the extensive margin (where
firms drop out of some markets altogether
or reduce the range of products sold).
Table 1 shows that virtually all of the
trade collapse was driven by changes in
the prices quoted and the quantities
shipped. Though both exports and imports
fell by about 27%, almost all trading firms
remained active, with hardly any changes
in the average number of countries they
traded with or in the average number of
products shipped to or sourced from each
country.
On the one hand, these results echo
findings by CEP’s Stephen Redding and
colleagues on the impact of the Asian
financial crisis on US trade along these
different margins (Bernard et al, 2009).
They also confirm evidence on comparable
French data for the 2008-09 crisis
(Bricongne et al, 2009).
On the other hand, these results
highlight the extreme flexibility of business
relationships across firms, their input
suppliers and their clients. This is
reassuring: a massive reduction in the
number of trading firms, countries or
products would probably make recovery
more costly and sluggish.
Table 1:
Changes in the margins of Belgian trade, comparing the 
first half of 2008 and the first half of 2009
Total imports (all firm-country-product combinations)
Extensive margin Intensive Components
margin of sales
Period Total imports Firms Countries Products Sales Quantities Prices
First half of 2008 €106.10bn 31,497 3.88 7.02 €123,681 118,747 1.04
First half of 2009 €76.64bn 33,576 3.74 6.78 €89,855 98,089 0.92
Percentage change between 
2008 and 2009 -27.77% 6.60% -3.54% -3.32% -27.35% -17.40% -12.05%
Percentage contribution of
each margin to the fall in trade 1.79% 98.21%
Total exports (all firm-country-product combinations)
Extensive margin Intensive Components
margin of sales
Period Total exports Firms Countries Products Sales Quantities Prices
First half of 2008 €101.25bn 18,053 6.62 5.58 €151,844 115,277 1.32
First half of 2009 €74.69bn 18,227 6.49 5.59 €112,925 92,221 1.22
Percentage change between 
2008 and 2009 -26.23% 0.96% -1.92% 0.16% -25.63% -20.00% -7.04%
Percentage contribution of
each margin to the fall in trade 2.68% 97.32%
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This article summarises ‘Trade Crisis? What
Trade Crisis?’ by Kristian Behrens, Gregory
Corcos and Giordano Mion, CEP Discussion
Paper No. 995 (http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/
download/dp0995.pdf).
Kristian Behrens is at the Université du
Québec à Montréal. Gregory Corcos is at the
Norwegian School of Economics and Business
Administration. Giordano Mion is a lecturer
in economic geography at LSE and an
associate in CEP’s globalisation programme.
Few systematic differences
within or between industries
Next, we analyse the fall in the intensive
margin of trade across the firm, country
and product dimensions to see if some
firms, industries, countries or products
were affected more than others. Our
analysis shows that the intensive margin
fall was driven by a generalised reduction
in demand for tradables as measured by
the reduction of GDP growth in the
destination markets.
Our analysis further reveals that
demand for consumer durables and
intermediate goods was more severely
affected than demand for consumer non-
durables. The remaining fall in trade is
explained by the poor financial health of
firms in the wake of the credit crunch and
their degree of involvement in
international value chains.
A comparable fall in
domestic operations
Finally, we consider changes in exports-to-
turnover and imports-to-intermediates
ratios at the firm level. This allows us to
compare the magnitude of the fall in
domestic economic activity with the
magnitude of the fall in international
trade. On aggregate, the ratios of exports
and imports to production did not fall,
confirming other evidence for OECD
countries (Eaton et al, 2009). Crucially, our
analysis reveals no cross-industry pattern
and no differences driven by firm
characteristics, indicating that finance and
disruption of value chains affected firms’
international and domestic activities
equally. 
Conclusion
Our investigation leads to the conclusion
that trade per se is not in crisis and so it
would be better to talk about a trade
collapse rather than a trade crisis. A
generalised fall in demand for tradables,
affecting international and domestic
operations with a roughly similar
magnitude, was the key shock. Further
investigation of what drove that fall in
demand is certainly needed, with sector
biases in fiscal stimuli, a fall in commodity
prices and product substitution by
consumers among the suspects.
Further reading
Richard Baldwin (ed.) (2009) The Great Trade
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Prospects, Centre for Economic Policy
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Unequal shares: the economics
of elite football clubs
The top clubs in the major football leagues of Europe
invariably come from big cities. In England’s Premier
League, for example, the top nine clubs last season came
from four big cities: London, Birmingham, Manchester
and Liverpool. Why do we see this empirical 
regularity and what does it imply for players, managers,
fans and owners?
The logic is as follows: big cities allow for a big fan base
and a big stadium – and cities are typically old enough
to have clubs with a rich history. The combination of the
fan base, the stadium and the history makes for high
revenues. High revenues allow for the purchase of the
star players who are crucial for both commercial and
football success. The stars attract more TV coverage and
enhance merchandise sales, thereby augmenting
revenues. And with football games often decided by a
one or two goal margin, the stars’ skills prove crucial.
Positive feedback follows: with commercial and football
success, the fan base rises, star players are more easily
attracted, revenues increase and the process is repeated.
While it is true that not every club in a big city joins the
elite and not every big city has an elite club, the elite
clubs do come from the big cities.
This positive feedback mechanism leads to a very skewed
distribution of clubs, with a handful dominating in terms
of both football and revenues. The numerous other clubs
are left with relatively low revenues and few trophies. 
In terms of players, the distribution is also skewed, with
the stars concentrating in the big clubs.
Take the following striking example: in the 18 seasons of
England’s Premier League, it has been won by
Manchester United 11 times. The other seven times were
won by just three clubs: Arsenal and Chelsea (three
times each) and Blackburn (once).
In the other major European leagues the situation is
similar if not more extreme. There are two big Spanish
clubs – Real Madrid and Barcelona – which are placed
much higher than the rest in terms of both revenues and
football. Together they have won 51 out of 79 league
titles. Similarly, there are four Italian clubs topping the
revenue list and the league – Juventus, Inter Milan, AC
Milan and Roma. The situation is similar in Germany,
Italy, Portugal and other European countries. 
Will global mass communications change this? Probably
not, as TV viewers and web users are attracted to the
successful, rich clubs with the stars, thereby yet again
augmenting their revenues and profits.
Can a club break into this elite group? Given the
circularity of big city size, big fan base, big revenues and
big football success, it is hard. The implication is that
only a club that is able to buy stars and to build a big
fan base with a big stadium can enter the elite group.
Manchester City is probably an experiment in progress in
this direction, but the outcome is still uncertain.
In any case, it looks like very few clubs will be able even
to try. This means it makes sense for investors to buy
clubs like Manchester United, Chelsea or Liverpool.
Buying a club like Portsmouth or even Newcastle is much
less interesting.
Another issue is the difference between the very top
teams (such as Manchester United) and the second tier
of the elite group (such as Arsenal). The very top teams
have a squad with more stars. It therefore pays to invest
in these players to move up within the elite group.
This explains why the wages paid to footballers and their
transfer fees have risen so much. There are few elite
clubs and they compete for a small number of stars. 
The high wages and high prices of the stars pull up the
wages and prices of the rest. The ‘small elite’ set-up
generates a ‘race to the top’ as each star can make a 
big difference.
A few elite clubs dominate the football leagues of Europe. Eran Yashiv
examines what drives the success of these clubs both on and off the field,
how it has generated the big increase in footballers’ pay and transfer fees –
and prospects for the clubs and their owners.
in brief...
Being at the top means
high wages for footballers
and satisfaction for fans –
but not handsome profits
for the shareholders
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This is a bad outcome for club owners and managers. 
No wonder that the latter keep complaining about the
high cost of players. And in recent years, we have seen
only small profits or even losses at the big clubs. This is
due to the high expense of footballers as well as the
need to keep investing in stadiums and merchandising to
maintain elite club status. So being at the top may mean
high wages for players and satisfaction for fans but not
necessarily handsome profits for the shareholders. 
This structure of the industry evidently has important
implications for potential buyers and sellers of clubs, as
well as investors. There are two ways in which it may
eventually change: one is when profits in the elite clubs
are so low or negative (due to high wages and high
costs of buying players) that a new regime emerges, one
of lower costs and a more even distribution. This may
happen through the piling up of debt, which will require
the clubs to scale back.
Change may also occur if governments intervene 
and impose salary caps: this would also lead to a 
more equal distribution. But until such things happen,
football will remain a very unequal sport and a very
unequal business.
Eran Yashiv is a professor of economics at Tel Aviv University
and a CEP research associate.
Football is likely 
to remain a very
unequal sport 
and a very 
unequal business
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